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Abstract and Keywords
This article is intended as an introduction to the central questions about composition and 
a highly selective overview of various answers to those questions. §1 reviews some formal 
features of parthood that are important for understanding the nature of composition. §2 
examines the special composition question: which pluralities of objects together compose 
something? §§3–4 examines the argument from vagueness for unrestricted composition. 
§5 addresses questions concerning the uniqueness of composition, coincident objects, 
hylomorphism, and the so-called grounding problem. §6 concernes the question of which 
composites exist fundamentally.
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When some objects are the parts of another object, they compose that object, and that 
object is composite. This article is intended as an introduction to the central questions 
about composition and a highly selective overview of various answers to those questions. 
In §1, we review some formal features of parthood that are important for understanding 
the nature of composition. In §2, we consider some answers to the question: which 
pluralities of objects together compose something? As we will see, the dominant answers 
are all of them and none of them. In §§3–4, we examine one of the main arguments that 
has driven philosophers to these extreme answers: the argument from vagueness. In §5, 
we turn to the question of whether composition is unique: is it sometimes the case that 
some things compose more than one thing? Finally, in §6, we turn from the question of 
which composites exist to the question of which composites exist fundamentally.
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1. Preliminaries
1.1 Mereological Preliminaries
The composition relation is defined in terms of parthood: some things, the xs, compose
something, y, iff (i) each of the xs is a part of y, and (ii) each part of y overlaps (i.e., 
shares a part with) at least one of the xs.  So it will be useful to begin with an overview of 
some common assumptions in the theory of parthood (a.k.a. mereology).
The parthood relation is widely assumed to be a partial ordering, which is to say that it is 
reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive. The assumption that parthood is reflexive—that 
everything is a part of itself—may seem odd. The table has its legs as parts, but the table 
intuitively does not have itself as a part. If anything, the parthood relation seems to be
irreflexive. However, this worry can easily be quieted. Those who maintain that parthood 
is reflexive will readily concede that the familiar relation expressed by such ordinary uses 
of ‘part’ as ‘the handle is a part of the mug’ is not reflexive. We may call this familiar 
relation proper parthood. The metaphysician’s somewhat artificial, extended use of ‘part’ 
can then be understood in terms of proper parthood: x is a part of y (in the intended 
sense) iff  x is a proper part of y or x = y. So defined, since everything is identical to 
itself, it follows trivially that everything is a part of itself. This artificial use of ‘part’ is a 
mere convenience and can be eliminated and replaced with more complex formulations 
that employ ‘part’ in its ordinary sense.
Since parthood is reflexive, it is not asymmetric. (It is sometimes the case that x is a part 
of y and y is a part of x, namely, whenever x = y.) But parthood does appear to be anti-
symmetric, that is, it is impossible for distinct objects x and y to be such that x is a part of 
y and y is a part of x.  And it is highly plausible that parthood is transitive: every part of a 
part of an object is also a part of that object.
One may be tempted to deny the transitivity of parthood on the basis of examples like the 
following. Suppose that, although astronomers have studied the planet Osiris, they have 
not had the opportunity to study its core. The core is a part of Osiris and Osiris is a part 
of the assortment of objects studied by astronomers. So, if parthood is transitive, it seems 
to follow that the core is likewise a part of that assortment:
(A1) Osiris’s core is a part of Osiris.
(A2) Osiris is a part of the assortment of things that have been studied by 
astronomers.
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(A3) If x is a part of y and y is a part of z, then x is a part of z.
(A4) So, Osiris’s core is a part of the assortment of things that have been studied by 
astronomers.
A1 and A2 seem true, and yet A4 is plainly false. So, the idea goes, the culprit must be 
A3, the principle of transitivity.
Such arguments very plausibly rest on some sort of equivocation, although the exact 
nature of the equivocation is debatable. There are two basic approaches. The first is to 
maintain that the argument is sound so long as ‘part’ is being used in its broadest sense. 
But, the idea goes, ‘part’ has various restricted uses as well, and when A4 seems false to 
us, we are hearing some restricted use of ‘part’. For instance, perhaps we are hearing it 
as saying that the core is a direct part of the assortment, where x is a direct part of y iff x 
is a part of y but not in virtue of being a part of something else.  And indeed A4 is false if 
we read ‘part’ as ‘direct part’. But then so is A3: direct parthood plainly is not transitive.
The other approach (which we prefer) is to deny that there is any sense of ‘part’ on which 
the argument is sound. One way to develop this response proceeds from the idea that ‘the 
assortment of things studied by astronomers’ is grammatically singular but referentially 
plural—it refers not to one thing but to many—and ‘part’ is naturally read as expressing 
the amongness relation in combination with such terms. Thus, on this approach, ‘Osiris is 
a part of the assortment’ means that Osiris is among them—it is one of them—where the
them in question is Osiris, Saturn, Neptune, and the other things that have been studied 
by astronomers.  So A2 is true when ‘part’ is read as expressing amongness but, the idea 
goes, it is false when read as expressing the ordinary parthood relation that holds 
between a mug and its handle. Yet if ‘part’ is read as expressing amongness throughout, 
A1 is false: the core is not among Osiris. So the argument rests on an equivocation.
The thesis that the assortment is identical to the items currently in the assortment may 
appear to fall victim to Leibniz’s Law arguments like the following. Suppose that 
astronomers later discover and study a new galaxy. When this happens, the assortment of 
things that they have studied gets larger. But the things that (as of now) they have 
studied do not get any larger. So it may appear that, by Leibniz’s Law, they are distinct. 
Appearances, though, are surely deceiving. No one thing truly gets larger when the 
assortment gets larger, any more than some one thing gets longer when the part of this 
sentence that you have read gets longer. The truth conditions of ‘the assortment got 
larger’ require only that ‘the assortment’ first refers to some things, later refers to some 
other things, and that the latter are greater in number than the former.
A similar strategy can be used to address other putative counterexamples to the 
transitivity of parthood. For instance, Kagan is a part of the Supreme Court, and her arm 
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is a part of her, but her arm is not a part of the Supreme Court.  ‘The Supreme Court’ 
refers plurally to the nine justices, and ‘is a part of’ in ‘Kagan is a part of the Supreme 
Court’ expresses the amongness relation, as it is wont to do in combination with 
referentially plural terms. There are, to be sure, apparent differences between the 
Supreme Court and the nine justices. For instance, the former but not the latter will grow 
if a tenth justice is added to the Court. But these apparent differences, like the apparent 
differences between the studied objects and the assortment of studied objects, are 
arguably merely apparent as well. ,
1.2 Terminological Preliminaries
For the benefit of newcomers to this literature, let us issue a few warnings about varying 
uses of relevant terminology.
First, ‘fusion’ is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘composite’: something is a fusion 
iff it has proper parts. Other times it is used to characterize a very specific kind of 
composite, one that has all of its parts necessarily. So, a table is a fusion in the first sense 
but (very plausibly) is not a fusion in the second sense. The same goes for ‘sum’.
Second, we have said that the xs compose y just in case (i) each of the xs is a part of y and 
(ii) each part of y overlaps at least one of the xs. But some add a further condition to the 
definition: (iii) no two of the xs overlap.  On this more stringent use of ‘composition’, 
your left hand and left thumb do not count as composing anything because they share 
parts in common (e.g., a thumbnail), though they can still be said to have a fusion (or a 
sum).
Third, ‘composition’ and ‘constitution’ are standardly used to refer to different relations. 
Constitution is commonly construed as a relation that always relates a single object (e.g., 
a lump of clay) to another single object (e.g., a statue).  Composition, by contrast, is a 
relation that can relate a single object (e.g., a statue) to a plurality of objects (e.g., a 
head, torso, legs, and arms).
Fourth, ‘mereology’ is used to refer to the philosophical study of parthood, or sometimes, 
more narrowly, to formal approaches to the topic. But it is also sometimes used to refer 
to a particular theory of parthood—classical extensional mereology—which holds (among 
other things) that composition is unrestricted (see §2) and unique (see §5).
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2. The Special Composition Question
The special composition question asks: under what conditions do some things compose 
something?  A useful answer will give us some insight into which composites there are, 
as well as some idea of what sorts of nonmereological facts are relevant to determining 
the mereological facts. So we would not be satisfied with a mere reiteration of the 
definition of composition: some xs compose something iff there is something, y, such that 
each of the xs is a part of y, and each part of y overlaps at least one of the xs.
The two extreme answers to the question fare better in this regard. On one extreme, we 
have universalism, the thesis that pluralities of objects always compose something:
Universalism Some objects compose something iff they exist.
Thus, assuming that your nose and the Eiffel Tower both exist, universalism will entail 
that there is something composed of your nose and the Eiffel Tower, something that is 
partly fleshy and on your face and partly iron and in Paris.
We say assuming that these objects exist because universalism is actually silent on the 
question of which kinds of objects there are. Whenever there are some things arranged 
nosewise, universalism will deliver something composed of those things. But it remains 
open to universalists to deny that this composite is a nose. Universalism does not by itself 
deliver an ontology of ordinary objects.
The other extreme answer is nihilism, the thesis that two or more things never together 
compose anything. Framed as an answer to the special composition question, it often 
receives the following peculiar formulation:
Nihilism Some objects compose something iff there is exactly one of them.
Why “exactly one of them”? Since each object is trivially a part of itself (on the reflexive 
use of ‘part’), each object trivially composes itself; so, assuming that a single object is 
“some objects”, each object is some objects that compose something, namely, itself.
So what is there according to the nihilist? Nihilists typically accept countless microscopic 
simples (i.e., partless objects). However, nihilism is also compatible with existence 
monism, the thesis that there is a single, all-encompassing simple (the cosmos).  Either 
way, assuming that ordinary objects like tables, if they exist, are individual composite 
objects, nihilism will entail that there are no such ordinary objects. We say assuming
because one may in principle accept a nonstandard nihilist view on which, just as ‘the 
13
14
15
16
17
18
Composition
Page 6 of 46
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 15 November 2016
assortment’ refers plurally to the assorted items (see §1.1), ‘the table’ refers plurally to 
the simples that we would ordinarily take to compose the table. In that case, there is a 
table, but the table is not an individual composite object; it is many objects.
Common sense would seem to demand some answer between the two extremes of 
universalism and nihilism. Surprisingly, though, the extreme answers have dominated the 
discussion of the special composition question. Why have moderate answers—those 
between the two extremes—been largely neglected?
There are at least three reasons. The first is that many regard the extreme answers as 
being entirely compatible with common sense and advance compatibilist accounts of the 
apparent conflict.  For example, universalists will concede that, when confronted with a 
nose and the Eiffel Tower, common sense demands that we assent to ‘there is nothing 
partly fleshy and partly metal’. But universalists often try to accommodate this demand 
by appeal to quantifier domain restriction: just as someone who looks in the fridge and 
says ‘there is no beer’ means only that there is no beer in the fridge, one can say ‘there is 
nothing partly fleshy and partly metal’ and mean only that there is nothing belonging to 
any familiar kind that is partly fleshy and partly metal.  And universalists will readily 
admit that nose-tower fusions are not a familiar kind of thing.
Nihilists also have compatibilist strategies. For instance, some have suggested that a 
sentence like ‘there are composite objects’ means one thing in the mouth of an ordinary 
speaker and means something different in the mouth of an ontologist. Ordinary 
utterances of that sentence, the idea goes, express a commonsense truth about what 
exists , while ontological utterances express a distinct (and false) proposition about what 
exists . The idea, then, is that nihilists do not run afoul of common sense in denying that 
composites exist  because, while common sense has clear views about what exists , it has 
nothing to say about what exists  (which on this view is something that only ontologists 
care about).
The second reason that moderate answers have been largely neglected is that it has 
proven extraordinarily difficult to articulate a moderate answer to the special 
composition question that delivers a commonsense ontology. The only moderate answer 
that has generated any substantial discussion is van Inwagen’s decidedly non-
commonsensical organicist answer:
Organicism Some objects compose something iff their activity constitutes a life.
This entails that organisms are the only composites, thus (apparently) flying in the face of 
common sense by excluding all of the inanimate composites.
19
20
21
1
2
2 1
2
22
23
24
Composition
Page 7 of 46
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 15 November 2016
Another moderate answer, one which does look to be compatible with common sense, has 
recently been advanced by Ned Markosian:
Regionalism Some objects, the xs, compose something iff there is a region, r, and 
an object, y, such that r is the fusion of the regions occupied by the xs and y 
occupies r.
In other words, some things compose something whenever there’s an object in the region 
they jointly occupy. Regionalism is an immediate consequence of the spatial theory of 
parthood:
STP x is a part of y iff the region occupied by x is a subregion of the region 
occupied by y.
But while this answer is compatible with common sense, it doesn’t deliver a 
commonsense ontology; it does not even rule out universalism or nihilism. Accordingly, it 
gives us little insight into which objects there are.  Moreover, there are apparent 
counterexamples to both regionalism and STP involving interpenetrating objects. For 
instance, it seems at least possible for there to be an object that passes through a larger 
object and that, for a moment, is completely within the boundaries of the larger object. 
Plausibly, the smaller object needn’t be a part of the larger object at that moment. But 
regionalism entails that it must be: since the smaller object’s region occupies a subregion 
of the larger object’s region, it follows that the larger object is partly composed of the 
smaller one.
Neither organicism nor regionalism delivers a commonsense ontology. However,
Carmichael (2015) develops a moderate answer that does (or at least comes close). The 
answer centrally depends on a distinction between two kinds of material objects: event-
based objects such as organisms or hurricanes and lump-like objects such as rocks. 
Roughly, the idea is that, if some things are event-based, then they can compose a further 
object only by being caught up in a “unity-imposing event” (e.g., a life).  But, if some 
things are lump-like, they can compose a further object either by being caught up in such 
an event or by simply being bonded together. Putting this all together, we get
compositional disjunctivism, a series-style answer to the special composition question 
(one that identifies different relations underlying composition for different kinds of 
composers):
Disjunctivism Necessarily, for all xs, there is a y such that the xs compose y iff 
either (i) the xs are lump-like and the xs are bonded, or (ii) the activities of the xs 
constitute an event that imposes sufficient unity on the xs.
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The answer arguably does not deliver all of the composites recognized by common sense, 
in particular, ordinary scattered objects such as supreme courts (more on this below). But 
it does explain why two people cannot come to compose something by being bonded at 
the hand, while some bricks can come to compose a wall by being bonded together.
The third reason that the extreme answers have dominated these discussions is that there 
are powerful arguments that purport to show that any answer that does deliver a 
commonsense ontology is bound to give rise to objectionable sorts of arbitrariness and
vagueness.
Arbitrariness arguments proceed from the observation that there seem to be no 
explanatory differences between certain objects that common sense recognizes and those 
it doesn’t. For instance, any account that accords with common sense will need to deliver 
scattered objects like supreme courts, but no extraordinary object composed of your nose 
and the Eiffel Tower. Yet there would seem to be no difference between them that could 
explain why there are things of the one kind but not the other. Thus, the idea goes, any 
answer that does deliver a commonsense ontology is bound to be intolerably arbitrary 
and should be rejected for that reason.
But these arguments are far from decisive. As we saw in §1.1, ‘the Supreme Court’ 
arguably does not refer to a single composite object at all, but rather refers plurally to 
nine things. In that case, unlike the putative object composed of your nose and the Eiffel 
Tower, the Supreme Court is not a single object; rather, it is nine objects. This is an 
explanatory difference because there are plausibly constraints on how some things must 
be integrated in order to compose a single object, constraints which rule out there being 
an object composed of your nose and the Eiffel Tower. Since the Supreme Court justices 
don’t compose a single object, such constraints have no bearing on the existence of the 
Supreme Court.
The argument from vagueness has received far more critical attention than the 
arbitrariness arguments. The next two sections are devoted to examining the argument 
from vagueness and some possible responses.
3. The Argument from Vagueness
Here is the argument from vagueness:
(B1) If universalism and nihilism are false, then it is possible for there to be a sorites 
series for composition.
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(B2) Any such sorites series must contain either an exact cut-off or borderline cases 
of composition.
(B3) There cannot be exact cut-offs in such sorites series.
(B4) There cannot be borderline cases of composition.
(B5) So either universalism or nihilism is true.
B1 is extremely plausible. A sorites series for composition is a series running from a case 
in which composition does not occur to a case in which it does occur, where adjacent 
cases in the series are extremely similar in all the respects that are intuitively relevant to 
whether composition occurs (e.g., spatial and causal relations). As an illustration, 
consider the assembly of a hammer from a handle and a head, and suppose (as common 
sense would have it) that they do not compose anything at the beginning of the assembly 
process and that they do compose something by the end. In that case, the moment by 
moment series leading from the beginning to the end of the assembly would be a sorites 
series for composition.
The idea behind B2 is that any such series must contain some transition from composition 
not occurring to composition occurring, and in any given series there either will or will 
not be an exact point at which that transition occurs.
B3 is plausible. If there is an exact cut-off in such a series, then surely there must be 
some explanation for why the cut-off is where it is; compositional facts are not brute.
Yet the sorts of differences that one finds among adjacent cases in a sorites series for 
composition—for instance, that the handle and head are a fraction of a nanometer closer 
together in the one than in the other—can’t plausibly explain why the cut-off occurs just 
there.
The argument against borderline cases of composition turns on the observation that if 
there were such borderline cases, then some numerical sentence would evidently have to 
lack a determinate truth value. A numerical sentence is a sentence of the following sort 
which says, for some number n, that there are exactly n concrete objects (in this case, n 
 ކࣄ[ࣄ\[ࣷ\	&[	&\	ࣂ]&]ࡔ[ ]࣢\ ]އ  Here, then, is the argument for B4:
(B6) If there could be borderline cases of composition, then it is possible for some 
numerical sentence to lack a determinate truth value.
(B7) If it is possible for some numerical sentence to lack a determinate truth value, 
then some expression in some numerical sentence must be vague.
(B8) No expression in any numerical sentence is vague.
(B4) So, there cannot be borderline cases of composition.
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Here is the idea behind B6. Suppose (for ease of exposition) that the only objects that 
exist are a hammer handle, a hammer head, and that (if anything) which they compose. 
And suppose that it is indeterminate whether the handle and head compose something. In 
such a case, it would seem to be indeterminate how many objects there are: just the 
handle and head, or the handle, the head, and a further object composed of the two. 
Thus, the numerical sentence for two (above) would be neither determinately true nor 
determinately false.
The idea behind B7 is that, since the source of the indeterminacy would presumably be 
vagueness—as opposed to, say, reference failure or the open future—there must be some 
vague expression in the sentence that is responsible for the vagueness.
The defense of B8 turns on the assumption that an expression is vague only if there is a 
range of candidate precise meanings for the term (“precisifications”), none of which 
definitely has been selected as the meaning of the term and none of which definitely 
hasn’t. This is a central plank of the orthodox linguistic account of vagueness, according 
to which vagueness is always the result of our semantic indecision. Arguably, though, 
none of the expressions in the numerical sentence has multiple candidate precisifications. 
7DNHކࣂއކࣂއKDVPXOWLSOHSUHFLVLILFDWLRQVRQO\LILWKDVPXOWLSOHFDQGLGDWHGRPDLQVDWVRPH 
world at some time. In order for the domains to differ at all, there must be something that 
LVLQRQHEXWQRWWKHRWKHU<HWZKLFKHYHUSUHFLVLILFDWLRQRIކࣂއLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDGRPDLQ 
that leaves something out cannot be an admissible SUHFLVLILFDWLRQRIކࣂއVLQFHDQ\ 
FDQGLGDWHIRUEHLQJDSUHFLVLILFDWLRQRIކࣂއLQDQXPHULFDOVHQWHQFHZRXOGKDYHWRUDQJH 
RYHUDEVROXWHO\HYHU\WKLQJ6RކࣂއFDQQRWKDYHPXOWLSOHSUHFLVLILFDWLRQV
The usual strategies for resisting the argument involve denying B3 or B8. One can deny 
B3 by affirming that there can be exact cut-offs in such sorites series, and either 
supplying an explanation for the location of the cut-off or denying that any such 
explanation is needed.  Or one can deny B8 by either supplying candidate 
precisifications or denying that vagueness requires multiple precisifications.  But there 
have also been a number of recent attempts to block the argument at B6, by denying that 
borderline composition ever gives rise to indeterminacy in how many objects exist. Let us 
turn now to some of those attempts.
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4. Borderline Composition without Vague 
Existence
B6 says that if there can be borderline cases of composition, then there can be count 
indeterminacy—indeterminacy with respect to how many concrete objects there are. The 
premise does not require that all cases of borderline composition give rise to count 
indeterminacy, and rightly so, since some putative cases of borderline composition plainly 
would not result in count indeterminacy. Suppose, for instance, that there are exactly one 
billion things, the As, that are definite proper parts of Tibbles the cat and exactly one 
object, B, that is a borderline part of Tibbles. It is therefore indeterminate whether the As 
together with B compose Tibbles; and if they do not compose Tibbles then (pace
universalists) they plausibly do not compose anything at all. So the As together with B are 
a borderline case of composing something. But this is not a case of count indeterminacy. 
There are exactly a billion and two concrete objects in this case: Tibbles, B, and the 
billion As.
The reason that borderline composition does not give rise to count indeterminacy in the 
Tibbles case is that there is a DEO: a definitely existing object that the borderline 
composers are a borderline case of composing. By contrast, the hammer case does not 
seem to involve any DEO. There does not seem to be any definitely existing object that 
the handle and head are a borderline case of composing, which is why, in contrast to the 
Tibbles case, it would seem to be indeterminate whether there is something in addition to 
the borderline composers. So, unlike the Tibbles case, the hammer case does seem to 
give rise to existential indeterminacy and thus threatens to give rise to count 
indeterminacy.
Suppose, though, that one insists that there are DEOs in every case of borderline 
composition, even in the hammer case. Then one would deny B6: borderline composition 
never gives rise to count indeterminacy. We will examine a handful of such DEO 
maneuvers.
4.1 Eternalism
Eternalists maintain that past and future objects exist; not everything that exists is 
present.  They may say that there exists a DEO—namely, a future hammer—which the 
handle and head are (at present) a borderline case of composing. In that case, there are 
exactly three concrete objects: the handle, the head, and the hammer, which does not 
42
Composition
Page 12 of 46
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 15 November 2016
definitely exist at present but does definitely exist simpliciter. Thus, there is no count 
indeterminacy.
The problem with this strategy is that it cannot accommodate cases of aborted assembly. 
Suppose that I am affixing the handle to the head, but I abort the assembly process at 
some point in the grey area, that is, at one of the points at which it seems indeterminate 
whether the handle and head compose anything. In that case, there will be no definitely 
existing future hammer to serve as the DEO. So we would seem to have a borderline case 
of composition in which it is indeterminate whether there is anything (past, present, or 
future) in addition to the handle and head that they are a borderline case of composing. 
And that is enough to make B6 true.
What’s needed is an account that supplies a DEO even in aborted assembly cases. The 
following accounts do just that.
4.2 Necessitism
Necessitism is the thesis that necessarily everything necessarily exists.  So we exist 
necessarily, as do you. This is not to say that we are necessarily people, or even that we 
are necessarily concrete objects, but just that we necessarily exist (as something or 
other). Necessitists are also committed to the existence of merely possible people. For 
instance, it is possible for Wittgenstein to have had a daughter, so, by necessitist lights, 
there exists something which could have been his daughter. Given plausible Kripkean 
assumptions about origins, since in fact he had no daughter, no actual woman could have 
been his daughter. Nor could any other concrete or located object have been his 
daughter. So any entity that could have been his daughter must then be some 
nonconcrete, nonlocated object.
These contingently concrete necessary existents are well suited to play the role of DEO, 
even in aborted assembly cases. Even if the assembly is never completed—indeed, even if 
the assembly is never begun—there definitely exists an object (a DEO) that the handle 
and head would compose were the assembly carried to completion.  In the grey area, the 
handle and head are a borderline case of composing that object. Thus, even in the grey 
area, it is fully determinate which objects exist and how many objects exist.
Necessitism, however, is a hard pill to swallow. Necessitists have to deny such apparent 
truisms as it is contingent whether you exist and had your parents never met you would 
never have existed. Moreover, necessitism runs afoul of plausible essentialist theses. 
Very plausibly, the things which are actually tigers are necessarily tigers, in which case 
they are tigers in every world in which they exist. But, by necessitist lights, there are 
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worlds in which they are not even physical or concrete, much less tigers. So necessitists 
are committed to denying that tigers are necessarily tigers.
What necessitists can say is that tigers are necessarily tigers if concrete, that is, they are 
tigers in every world in which they are concrete.  However, it is unclear how this is 
supposed to mitigate the implausibility of necessitism’s anti-essentialist consequences. To 
see this, consider the equally plausible claim that tigers are necessarily concrete. The 
present rephrasal strategy would render this as tigers are necessarily concrete if 
concrete. But surely that’s not what we have in mind when ‘tigers are necessarily 
concrete’ strikes us as plausible. Worse, the intuitively true claim ‘unlike numbers, tigers 
are necessarily concrete’ gets rephrased as the falsehood unlike numbers, tigers are 
necessarily concrete if concrete—false, because numbers are (vacuously) concrete if 
concrete in all worlds.
4.3 Supersubstantivalism
Supersubstantivalism is the thesis that each material object is identical to the region of 
space that it occupies. To see how supersubstantivalists can resist B6, consider the 
following two theses. The first is the analogue of universalism for regions:
UR If the rs are some regions, there exists a region R such that (i) each of the rs is 
a subregion of R and (ii) every subregion of R shares a subregion with at least one 
of the rs.
The second is that regions are always parts of the regions whose subregions they are:
RP If r is a subregion of R, then r is part of R.
Suppose that supersubstantivalists accept UR but reject RP, placing some constraints on 
when some regions count as parts of the regions whose subregions they are (perhaps 
mirroring our intuitive constraints on when some objects are parts of something). In that 
case, they are well positioned to reject B6. By UR, there will be a region of space that the 
handle and head jointly occupy irrespective of whether they compose anything. Thus, 
even in borderline cases of composition, there is no indeterminacy in what exists: the 
handle, the head, and the region jointly occupied by the two. All that is indeterminate is 
whether they count as standing in the composition relation to the region whose 
subregions they are. B6 is false.
Like necessitism, many will find supersubstantivalism unpalatable. For one thing, it flies 
in the face of common sense: your head occupies a region of space but is not itself a 
region of space. Furthermore, objects and their locations differ in obvious ways. Your 
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head could have been somewhere else. But the region it occupies could not have been 
anywhere else. So, by Leibniz’s Law, your head is not identical to its location.  For these 
reasons, it would be preferable if we could execute a similar strategy for blocking B6—
one that invokes located and contingently existing DEOs—without relying on the 
extremely controversial identification of objects with regions. The following proposal 
promises to do just that.
4.4 Expansions
Let us say that y is an expansion of the xs just in case y exactly occupies the region that is 
jointly occupied by the xs.  One might naturally think that some objects have an 
expansion iff they compose something. Indeed, this follows straightaway from the right-
to-left direction of the aforementioned spatial theory of parthood:
STP  If the region occupied by x is a subregion of the region occupied by y, 
then x is a part of y.
Given STP , if the handle and head have an expansion in the grey area, then they 
definitely do compose something in the grey area.
But suppose one were to deny STP  (perhaps because of the problem involving 
interpenetrating objects mentioned in §2). Suppose, in particular, that although it is 
indeterminate whether the handle and head compose something in the grey area, there 
definitely exists an expansion of the handle and head at every point in the grey area. This 
would be an object which is exactly located in the region jointly occupied by the handle 
and head, but which does not now definitely have them as parts. Accordingly, this 
borderline case of composition does not give rise to count indeterminacy, since it is 
perfectly determinate which things exist in the grey area: the handle, the head, and the 
definitely existing expansion (our DEO) which they are a borderline case of composing. 
B6 is false.
But if objects don’t have to compose something in order to have an expansion, what does
it take for some objects to have one? A natural answer for proponents of the envisaged 
DEO maneuver is to say that some objects have an expansion iff it isn’t definitely the case 
that they do not compose anything.  That is, there’s an expansion whenever some things 
definitely compose something, and whenever it’s indeterminate whether they do, but not 
when they definitely don’t.
One serious problem with this answer has to do with higher-order vagueness. For just as 
there seems to be no sharp point at which the handle and head transition from definitely 
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composing nothing to definitely composing something, there seems to be no sharp point 
at which they transition from definitely composing nothing to its being indeterminate 
whether they compose something. And supposing that it is indeterminate where this 
transition occurs, there will be times at which it is indeterminate how many things exist: 
just the handle and head, or the handle, the head, and their expansion. But this is just to 
concede that B6 is true: borderline cases of composition do sometimes give rise to count 
indeterminacy.
The problem can be avoided. Following Williamson, we can define a super-definitely 
operator (D*) in terms of the definitely operator (D) as follows:
D*p iff  Dp & DDp & DDDp & …
It can be shown that if something is super-definitely true, then it is definitely super-
GHILQLWHO\WUXH'Sࡔ''S  Thus, while there can be vagueness with respect to what’s 
definitely the case, there can be no indeterminacy with respect to super-definiteness and, 
in particular, no indeterminacy with respect to whether some things super-definitely 
compose something.  Accordingly, we can escape the worry about higher-order 
indeterminacy by revising the above answer to say that some things have an expansion iff 
it is not super-definitely the case that they do not compose anything.
This modified answer has some consequences that some may find unpalatable. For 
consider again the case in which the As are all definitely parts of Tibbles and B is a 
borderline part. Since the As don’t super-definitely fail to compose something, the 
modified answer entails that they have an expansion, exactly located where they are. 
Likewise, the As together with B don’t super-definitely fail to compose something, in 
which case they too have an expansion, exactly located in the slightly larger region where 
they are. But those who oppose the argument from vagueness on the grounds that 
universalism violates common sense may wish to avoid this implication that there is a 
multitude of cat-like objects in the vicinity of Tibbles.
An alternative that would avoid this multitude is a picture on which there is a single 
definitely existing cat-like expansion in Tibbles’s vicinity, but it is not determinate which
candidate parts this expansion is an expansion of.  Thus, it is not determinate where 
exactly this expansion is located. Here is one way to develop this sort of picture. First, we 
say that the xs generate a DEO just in case they do not super-definitely fail to compose 
something. But we allow that different pluralities of objects can generate the same DEO. 
Specifically, the xs and the ys generate the same DEO just in case the xs generate a DEO, 
the ys generate a DEO, and each of the xs is either one of the ys or in the penumbra of 
the ys, and each of the ys is either one of the xs or in the penumbra of the xs. (An object x 
is in the penumbra of the ys just in case x is not one of the ys and it is not super-definitely 
def
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true that x and the ys fail to compose something.) Finally, we say that the xs have an 
H[SDQVLRQMXVWLQFDVHLWKH[VJHQHUDWHD'(2DQGLLWKHUHDUHQR\Vࣷ[VZKLFK 
compose something, and which are such that the xs and the ys generate the same DEO. 
Thus, in the Tibbles case, it is indeterminate whether the As have an expansion, since it is 
indeterminate whether the As and B compose something, and so indeterminate whether 
condition (ii) is satisfied.
The expansionist strategy provides a DEO in cases of aborted assembly, it allows material 
objects to be contingently existing and necessarily concrete, and it avoids the implausible 
identification of objects with their locations. For these reasons, we regard the 
expansionist strategy (in some form or other) as the most plausible DEO maneuver for 
resisting the argument from vagueness.
5. Uniqueness
We have been considering the question of whether some things ever (or always) compose 
something. Let us turn now to the question of whether some things ever compose more 
than one thing. It is at least prima facie plausible that this never happens: objects 
compose at most one object at any given time. Call this Uniqueness:
Uniqueness If x and y have the same proper parts, then x = y.
And yet there appear to be counterexamples.
5.1 Leibniz’s Law and Colocated Objects
Athena is a clay statue, and Piece is the piece of clay of which it is made.  Athena and 
Piece seem to have exactly the same proper parts. But they evidently differ in other 
respects: Piece but not Athena is able to survive being flattened. So, by Leibniz’s Law, 
they must be distinct. Call this Distinctness:
Distinctness $WKHQDࣷ3LHFH
Let us call the thesis that objects are typically (if not always) distinct from the pieces of 
matter that share their location colocationism.
Suppose that this argument is sound and that colocationism is correct.  Must we then 
suppose that Athena and Piece are a counterexample to Uniqueness? Perhaps not. We 
will examine three strategies for reconciling Uniqueness and colocationism: denying that 
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Athena and Piece have the same ordinary spatial parts, denying that they have the same 
temporal parts, and denying that they have the same formal parts.
First, colocationists will likely maintain that Athena’s arm is a part of Athena but not a 
part of Piece.  After all, when the statue is squashed, its arm is destroyed but no part of 
the piece of clay is destroyed. But one need not look far to find new counterexamples to 
Uniqueness. Take Athena’s thumbnail, Nail, and the piece of clay that constitutes it, 
Piece . Piece  but not Nail can survive being rolled into a ball, which, by Leibniz’s Law, 
HQWDLOVWKDW1DLOࣷ3LHFH . But whereas there are ordinary spatial parts of Athena that 
intuitively are not parts of Piece, there do not appear to be any ordinary spatial parts of 
Nail that are not parts of Piece . So this strategy cannot handle all apparent 
counterexamples to Uniqueness.
Second, one might maintain that Athena and Piece have different temporal parts. Here 
the idea is that Athena and Piece are each four-dimensional objects, composed of 
instantaneous three-dimensional “slices” or “stages”. Suppose that Piece existed on 
Monday and was not made into a statue until Tuesday. In that case, Athena and Piece 
share some of their temporal parts—for instance, the three-dimensional statue-shaped 
slices that are around on Tuesday—but only Piece has as parts Monday’s three-
dimensional lump-shaped slices. So this is no counterexample to Uniqueness. Again, 
though, this strategy cannot handle all apparent counterexamples. For suppose that 
Athena and Piece come into existence simultaneously and cease to exist simultaneously.
Suppose, for instance, that the materials used to create Piece were mixed in the very 
mold used to make Athena, so that when they hardened they were already in the shape of 
a statue, and that both were later simultaneously annihilated. In that case, even 
supposing that they have temporal parts, they will have precisely the same temporal 
parts.
The third, hylomorphic strategy relies on the idea that Piece and Athena, despite being 
made of the same matter, have different forms. There are different conceptions of what 
sorts of things forms might be: universals, tropes, powers, events, sortals, structures, etc. 
For purposes of illustration, let us suppose that forms are shapes: being Athena-shaped is 
Athena’s form and being Piece-shaped is Piece’s form. The property of being Athena-
shaped is a determinable of which the specific shapes that Athena is capable of taking on 
are determinates. Similarly, the property of being Piece-shaped is a determinable of 
which the (wider range) of specific shapes that Piece can take on are determinates.  The 
idea, then, is that, while both Athena and Piece instantiate both shapes, only Athena has 
Athena-shapedness as its form and only Piece has Piece-shapedness as its form.
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But if an object’s instantiating a form does not suffice for the object to have it as its form, 
what more is required? One possible answer is that the object must additionally have the 
form as a part. According to mereological hylomorphism, the form of an object is literally 
a part of the object; an object’s parts are not limited to material objects.  Athena’s form 
is a part of Athena but not Piece, and Piece’s form is a part of Piece but not Athena. Thus, 
there is no counterexample to Uniqueness; they do not share all of their parts. 
Mereological hylomorphism also easily handles cases of permanent colocation, for even 
permanently colocated objects can differ in form. And it easily handles the case of Nail 
and Piece , which themselves differ in form. Finally, it offers a distinctive solution to the 
most serious objection to colocationism: the grounding problem.
5.2 Mereological Hylomorphism and the Grounding Problem
The grounding problem for colocationism is that the putative modal and sortal differences 
between colocated objects like Athena and Piece seem to stand in need of explanation, 
and yet there seems to be no further difference between them that is poised to explain 
their modal and sortal differences.  Here, then, is the hylomorphic solution to the 
grounding problem. Athena and Piece have different modal and sortal properties because 
they have different forms. Piece is possibly flat because it has being Piece-shaped as its 
form; Athena isn’t possibly flat because it has being Athena-shaped as its form. Athena, 
unlike Piece, is a statue because, unlike Piece, it has being Athena-shaped as its form.
For the mereological hylomorphist, Athena but not Piece has being Athena-shaped as its 
form because Athena but not Piece has it as a part. But one might object that this simply 
gives rise to a new grounding problem, for now the hylomorphist owes us some 
explanation of the mereological difference between Athena and Piece.  Both instantiate 
Piece-shapedness, and both instantiate Athena-shapedness, so what could explain why 
Athena-shapedness is a part of the one but not the other, while Piece-shapedness is a part 
of the other but not the one?
Hylomorphists ought to respond that there is no explanation of why Athena-shapedness is 
a part of Athena and not a part of Piece. This mereological difference is explanatory 
bedrock. And there is special reason to suppose that mereological differences are 
sometimes explanatory bedrock. To see this consider “Lefty”, the left one-third of a 
certain brick. In virtue of what is Lefty a part of the brick but not a part of the right two-
thirds of the brick? There is no plausible answer; it just is a part of the one but not the 
other.  Or consider the four-dimensionalist account described above, according to which 
Piece has temporal parts that Athena lacks. Here is a question that one would not think to 
put to a four-dimensionalist: in virtue of what are they parts of Piece rather than parts of 
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Athena?  Nor have four-dimensionalists been concerned to answer that question. That’s 
because the question does not seem to require an answer. These kinds of mereological 
differences are explanatory bedrock.
One might object that these mereological facts are explained in terms of the locations of 
the various objects: Lefty is a part of the brick because Lefty is located in a subregion of 
the brick’s location. More precisely:
Lefty is a part of the brick because Lefty is in R  and the brick is in R  and R
is a subregion of R .
But plausibly the explanation goes in the opposite direction: composites are located 
where they are because they have parts in those locations.  In particular, the brick is in 
R  because it has parts in the subregions of R . And the brick has parts in the subregions 
of R  partly because Lefty is a part of the brick and is in a subregion of R . By transitivity 
of explanation:
The brick is in R  partly because Lefty is part of the brick.
So, on pain of circularity, it cannot be that Lefty is part of the brick partly because the 
brick is in R . (Mutatis mutandis for Athena and Piece.)
Moreover, if parthood is to be explained in terms of location, then it’s plausible that 
STP  would have to be true. That is, it’s plausible that being in a subregion of an 
object’s location would have to suffice for being a part of that object.  But we have 
already seen good reasons for being dissatisfied with STP . For instance, it seems 
perfectly possible for one object to pass through another, and thus to be in a subregion of 
its location, without thereby becoming a part of it. If STP  is true, this cannot happen. 
Moreover, if STP  is true, then Athena’s arm is not only a part of Athena, but also a part 
of Piece, which is rather implausible, at least by colocationist lights. And, in any case, 
mereological hylomorphists are already committed to denying STP . Since Athena 
occupies a subregion of Piece’s location, STP  entails that Athena is a part of Piece. 
And, since Athena’s form is a part of Athena, it would follow (by transitivity) that Athena’s 
form is a part of Piece as well, contrary to hylomorphism.
Mereological facts are plausibly both explanatory and explanatory bedrock. Thus, 
hylomorphists do seem to be well positioned to solve the grounding problem.
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6. Fundamentality
In §2, we considered the question of whether any composite objects exist. We turn now to 
the question of whether any composite objects exist fundamentally. And while the nihilist 
view that there are no composite objects seems deeply implausible, there is something 
downright attractive about the view that at bottom there are no composite objects, or that 
fundamentally speaking there are only the atomic parts, or that composites have no role 
to play in a fundamental description of reality.
We will consider two ways of trying to capture this thought. On the first, the idea is that 
no composites are themselves fundamental objects. On the second, the idea is that some 
quantifiers are more fundamental than others and that the most fundamental quantifiers 
have no composite objects in their domains.
6.1 Fundamental Objects
Some things exist in virtue of others. For instance, there are cracks and holes, and these 
exist in virtue of there being cracked and perforated objects. Put another way, cracks and 
holes are less fundamental than their hosts. The same can be said of composites and their 
proper parts. A wooden ship exists in virtue of its planks existing and being arranged 
shipwise. The planks, in turn, exist in virtue of the (more fundamental) cellulose 
molecules that compose them. And so on.
The idea that composite objects exist in virtue of their parts, or are less fundamental than 
their parts, can be captured by the parthood priority thesis:
PPT For any objects x and y, if x is a proper part of y, then x is more fundamental 
than y.
What, then, is absolutely fundamental? On pain of explanatory regress, there must be
some fundamental level of objects, in which case PPT entails that the absolutely 
fundamental objects are mereological simples.  (For if any composite object were 
fundamental, then its parts could not be more fundamental than it, and PPT would be 
false.) Call this priority atomism:
Priority Atomism Some objects are fundamental, and every fundamental object 
is simple.
The idea, then, is that every object is either simple or exists in virtue of the simples of 
which it is composed.
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The problem is that it is at least conceivable that there are no simples. Perhaps every 
object decomposes into proper parts, ad infinitum. Call this the gunk thesis:
GT Every object has proper parts.
If GT is correct, then priority atomism is false: no objects are simple, so either there are 
no fundamental objects or some composites are fundamental. Indeed, it is problem 
enough for the priority atomist if gunk is so much as possible. For PPT—the primary 
motivation behind priority atomism—is presumably necessary if true. Whether composites 
exist in virtue of their parts or vice versa does not seem like the sort of thing that can 
vary from one world to the next.
One option, then, is to abandon priority atomism and PPT in favor of some other 
conception of the fundamental level of objects. For instance, priority monism:
Priority Monism There is exactly one fundamental object, the universe, and 
every object is a part of it.
Priority monists can accommodate the possibility of GT: even if there is an infinite 
descent of parts in some world, there will still always be a foundation for them, namely, 
the universe itself. But priority monism faces similar problems. For, arguably, if gunk is 
possible, then it is also possible for there to be infinite ascent of composites, each a 
proper part of some further composite. Call this the junk thesis:
JT For any object x, there is some object y such that x is a proper part of y.
If JT is true, then there is no object that every object is a part of, and priority monism is 
false. And if JT is possibly true, then priority monism is possibly false. But priority 
monism (like priority atomism) is presumably necessary if true.
The alternative is to deny GT and indeed to deny that GT is even possibly true.  What 
does seem obviously possible is that there be certain kinds of infinite descent. But infinite 
descent need not be endless: just as a Euclidean line can be divided infinitely into smaller 
and smaller line segments despite being ultimately composed of points, perhaps every 
composite object can be divided infinitely into smaller and smaller composite parts 
despite being ultimately composed of simples.
Furthermore, infinite descent need not be mereological. For instance, it does seem 
possible for there to be objects which can be divided into two halves, and whose halves 
can in turn be divided into two halves, and so on. But it is controversial whether the fact 
that an object o can be divided into two halves, h  and h , entails that o is not simple. 
There are at least two ways of resisting the entailment. The first is to deny that h  and h
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exist at all before the division: they are brought into existence when o is divided and, a 
fortiori, are not parts of o prior to division.  The second is to concede that, prior to 
division, h  and h  exist and are partially colocated with o, but to deny that they are parts 
of o.  This requires denying our old friend STP :
STP  If the region occupied by x is a subregion of the region occupied by y, 
then x is a part of y.
But as we have already seen, STP  is implausible. One object can pass through another, 
and be partially colocated with it, without thereby being a part of it.
Thus, one must be careful to distinguish mereological descent from other sorts of 
descent, not only when consulting intuitions about the possibility of GT, but also in 
evaluating alleged empirical support for the truth of GT.
6.2 Fundamental Quantification
We have thus far been considering the question of which objects are fundamental, and in 
particular whether any composites are fundamental. We turn now to the related, but 
importantly different question of whether the most fundamental quantifiers range over 
composites. (Or, as it is sometimes put: whether composites exist in the most 
fundamental sense of ‘exists’.) The question arises in part in connection with the 
compatibilist strategy touched upon in §2. Some philosophers who wish to affirm ‘there 
are no objects with parts’ also wish to deny that what they are saying is at odds with the 
truism expressed by an ordinary utterance of ‘there are some objects with parts’. One 
way to make good on this compatibilist hypothesis is to suppose that ‘there is’ means 
different things in ontological and ordinary discussions; in the former, but not the latter, 
it is a fundamental or “highly natural” quantifier, one that “carves reality at its joints”.
How are we to make sense of this notion of a fundamental quantifier that carves reality at 
its joints? Proponents of this idea say that the world has structure, and that some 
descriptions of the world are not only true but also superior to other true descriptions, 
insofar as they describe the world in a way that more “perspicuously” discloses (or 
matches or corresponds to) that structure.  Let Ontologese be the unique language—
assuming there is one—that is best equipped for so describing the world. Let the
existential  quantifier be the unique quantifier in Ontologese—assuming there is one—
ZKLFKLVLQIHUHQWLDOO\ࣄOLNHWKDWLVZKLFKSOD\VWKHVDPHFRUHLQIHUHQWLDOUROHDVWKH 
ordinary existential quantifier.  And let us say that x exists  just in case x is in the 
domain of the existential  quantifier.
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The aforementioned philosophers who would deny that composites exist  but not that 
they exist aren’t nihilists; nihilists deny that composites exist. Let’s call them deep 
nihilists. The question with which we began—whether the most fundamental quantifier 
ranges over composites—can then be rephrased as the question of whether deep nihilism 
is true.
What reason might we have for accepting deep nihilism? One might think that deep 
nihilism falls right out of priority atomism. If simples are the only fundamental objects, 
they must be the only objects in the domain of the fundamental quantifier.
But the inference from the claim that no composites are fundamental to the conclusion 
that the fundamental quantifier does not range over composites—or (equivalently) that 
the most fundamental mode of being is not enjoyed by composites—rests on an 
assumption that we see no good reason to accept, namely, that the relative 
fundamentality of a quantifier is measured by the relative fundamentality of the items in 
its domain. By way of comparison, one wouldn’t typically say that a relation can only be 
as fundamental as its least fundamental relata. Few would deny that identity is 
fundamental simply because entities of all kinds—fundamental and nonfundamental—
stand in the identity relation. Nor is it especially plausible that a restricted identity 
relation which relates only fundamental objects to themselves is more fundamental than 
identity simpliciter.  Nor does the fact that conjunction operates on nonfundamental 
propositions preclude it from being fundamental.
By parity, it is hardly obvious that the most fundamental mode of being cannot be one 
that is enjoyed by nonfundamental objects, or that the most fundamental quantifiers 
cannot range over nonfundamental objects. In other words, it is very much an open 
question whether the only things that exist  are the things mentioned in the simplest 
complete Ontologese description of the world. For it may be that some existents  are 
nonfundamental objects that have no business being mentioned in such a description, on 
pain of introducing redundancies and diminishing perspicuity.
Once we clearly distinguish the question of which objects are fundamental from the 
question of which mode of being is fundamental, other prima facie reasons for accepting 
deep nihilism lose their force as well. For instance, one might allege that composites do 
not exist  on grounds of ontological parsimony: an ontology that has only simples at the 
fundamental level is more parsimonious than one that treats both simples and composites 
as fundamental.  But, while ontological parsimony is plausibly an advantage, it is not a
distinctive advantage of deep nihilism. For one can wholeheartedly agree that no 
composites are fundamental, all the while maintaining that they enjoy the most 
fundamental mode of being. Put another way: there is no need to suppose that the most 
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fundamental quantifier “drags” its whole domain down into the fundamental level with 
it.
Similar points apply to the suggestion that deep nihilism has greater ideological
parsimony than its rivals. For instance, one might observe that deep nihilists do not need 
any mereological predicates in their fundamental ideology, since they have no composite 
objects at the fundamental level.  But deep universalists—according to whom all of the 
universalist’s arbitrary fusions exist —can agree that no composites are fundamental 
and, thus, will be just as well positioned as deep nihilists to eliminate mereological 
vocabulary from their fundamental ideology. For instance, deep universalists can 
maintain that the mere fact that fundamental objects f   f  exist  suffices to explain the 
(nonfundamental) fact that there exists  an object composed of f   f . Just as one can 
think that nonfundamental objects are more familiar than fundamental objects without 
thinking that the more familiar than relation must be referenced in one’s fundamental 
description of the world, one can think that some nonfundamental objects are composed 
of fundamental objects without thinking that the composition relation must be referenced 
in one’s fundamental description of the world. It is priority atomism, not deep nihilism, 
that secures the ideological parsimony.
Thus, although there is an interesting question of which objects are in the domain of the 
most fundamental quantifier—distinct from the question of which objects are 
fundamental—it is far from clear what the answer is, and whether there is any good 
reason to accept deep nihilism about what exists .
One final observation about nihilism, deep nihilism, and priority atomism. Given the 
prima facie implausibility of nihilism—that there are no objects with parts—one may be 
tempted by the thought that what nihilists meant to be saying or ought to have been 
saying all along is that priority atomism is true or that deep nihilism is true. But this 
would be a mistake.  Its problems notwithstanding, nihilism has advantages that are 
altogether lost if one is only willing to say that statues are not fundamental or that 
statues do not exist . The main reason to accept nihilism is that, by eliminating ordinary 
composites, one thereby escapes a number of problems and puzzles. Denying that statues 
and other familiar composites exist enables one to secure Uniqueness (see §5) without 
having to embrace colocationism (temporal parts, etc.), block the argument from 
vagueness without incurring commitment to vague existence (supersubstantivalism, etc.), 
and escape a variety of other problems involving overdetermination, overpopulation, 
arbitrariness, fission, and indeterminacy.  These problems all arise simply from the 
assumption that ordinary composites exist, and this is why nihilists, who deny that there 
are any composites, have a uniform solution to the problems. Those who are willing to say 
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only that composites aren’t fundamental or that they don’t exist  are left with the 
problems and must find some other response to them.
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Notes:
( ) One notable omission is the question of whether composition is identity, that is, 
whether a composite object is identical to its parts. See Baxter (1988a, 1988b), Lewis 
(1991: §3.6), van Inwagen (1994), Yi (1999), Sider (2007: §3), Wallace (2011a, 2011b), and
Baxter and Cotnoir (2014) for discussion. See Harte (2002: 114), Merricks (2005: 629–
631), Sider (2007: 61–62), McDaniel (2010b), and Cameron (2012) on whether the 
composition as identity thesis entails the universalist thesis discussed in §2.
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( ) Alternatively, one might define parthood in terms of composition: x is a part of y iff x is 
among some objects that compose y. See van Inwagen (1987: 24–25) on the 
interdefinability of parthood and composition. One reason to prefer the definition in the 
text is that if the xs compose y, then each part of y overlaps one of the xs is arguably true 
by definition, and this fails to come out true by definition on the alternative proposal.
( ) For instance, condition (ii) in the definition of composition would have to be replaced 
with: each part of y either shares a part with one of the xs or is identical to one of the xs.
( ) There are, however, some putative counterexamples, involving (among other things) 
time travel, propositions, and the Trinity. See Cotnoir and Bacon (2012: §1) for 
discussion.
( ) Cf. Casati and Varzi (1999: 34).
( ) We should perhaps go further, insisting that A2 as stated is false and only false: Osiris 
is part of the assortment but is not a part of the assortment. Cf. Sharvy (1983: 235) and
Simons (1987: 234–235). We ignore this complication here.
( ) Cf. Uzquiano (2004b: 136–137).
( ) See Uzquiano (2004b: §§4–5) for Leibniz’s Law arguments against the identification of 
the Supreme Court and the justices; cf. Ritchie (2013: §2). See Korman (2015b: §8.3.2) for 
criticism.
( ) For further discussion of putative counterexamples to transitivity, see Rescher (1955: 
10), Cruse (1979), Sharvy (1983: 236), Simons (1987: 107–108), Winston, et al. (1987: 
§§5–6), Iris, et al. (1988: 277–280), Sanford (1993: 220–222), Moltmann (1998: §1.5),
Hossack (2000: 423), Johnston (2002: 142–143), Rosen and Dorr (2002: 153), Schmitt 
(2003: 5–6), Brogaard (2004: 226), Johansson (2004), Varzi (2006), Effingham (2010: 
255), and Korman (2015b: §8.3.3).
( ) See van Inwagen (1990: 29).
( ) See, e.g., Bennett (2009: 45). Markosian (2004: §2, 2015: §1) and Kleinschmidt 
(2007), who hold that the lump of clay is an object while the clay itself is merely some 
stuff (and is not an object), reserve ‘constitution’ for a relation between some stuff and a 
single object.
( ) See /HĝQLHZVNL and Leonard and Goodman (1940) for early articulations of 
classical extensional mereology.
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( ) See van Inwagen (1990: ch. 2); see Hestevold (1981) for a precursor. Strictly 
speaking, the question posed by van Inwagen would be stated in our vocabulary as: under 
what conditions do some non-overlapping things compose something? Like van Inwagen 
(1990: 20), we restrict our discussion to material objects, except where otherwise 
indicated. For some discussion of questions of composition that arise for other sorts of 
entities, see Simons (1987: ch. 4), Chant (2006), King (2007), McDaniel (2009), Tillman 
and Fowler (2012), and Gilmore (2014).
( ) Cf. van Inwagen (1990: 31), Markosian (1998a: 212–213), and Higgins et al. (ms) on 
the constraints on a satisfactory answer.
( ) On the more stringent definition of composition alluded to at the end of §1.2, 
universalism must be characterized as the view that the xs compose something iff the xs 
are disjoint (i.e., don’t share any parts in common). Proponents of universalism include
/HĝQLHZVNL, McTaggart (1921/1968: 140–141), Leonard and Goodman (1940),
Goodman and Quine (1947), Cartwright (1975), Quine (1981: 10), Thomson (1983: 216–
217), Lewis (1986: 212–213, 1991: §1.3), Van Cleve (1986, 2008), Heller (1990: §2.9),
Armstrong (1997: 13), Sider (1997: §3.1, 2001: §4.9), Rea (1998), Fine (1999: 73), Hudson 
(2000, 2001: §3.8), Varzi (2003), Bigelow and Pargetter (2006), Braddon-Mitchell and 
Miller (2006), Baker (2007: 191–193), Schaffer (2009a: 358 n. 11), and Sattig (2015: 13–
14).
( ) See van Inwagen (1990: 73).
( ) We ourselves are not so sure that an object is some objects. Cf. Boolos (1984: 443): 
“Suppose that there is exactly one Cheerio in the bowl before me. Is it true to say that 
there are some Cheerios in the bowl? My view is no, not really, I guess not, but say what 
you like, it doesn’t matter very much.”
( ) Hossack (2000) and Dorr (2005) defend the microphysicalist version of nihilism.
+RUJDQDQG3RWUÏ, 2008: ch. 7) and Rea (2001) defend existence monism. Turner 
(2011) explores the extreme nihilist view that there are no objects. Sider (2013) embraces 
what we call deep nihilism (see §6.2 below), but it is a delicate question whether he is 
committed to the nihilist thesis stated above.
( ) See Liggins (2008) and Contessa (2014); see Korman (2015b: §8.3.3) for criticism. 
Alternatively, it is open to nihilists to insist that there are tables but that, despite 
appearances and despite being spatially extended, they are simples (see, e.g., Williams 
2006: §5).
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( ) And those who do acknowledge the conflict are often dismissive of common sense. 
See Hudson (2001: §3.8), Korman (2014), Osborne (forthcoming), Rose and Schaffer 
(forthcoming: §4), and Korman and Carmichael (forthcoming) on attempts to debunk 
common sense about composition.
( ) See Lewis (1986: 213, 1991: §3.5), Sosa (1999: 142), Jubien (2001: 14n2), Sider 
(2001: 218, 2004: 680), Rosen and Dorr (2002: §4), Varzi (2003: 213–214), Richard (2006: 
173), and Cameron (2007: 116, 2008b: 14). See Korman (2008a) and Rose and Schaffer 
(forthcoming: §3.6) for criticism.
( ) See Sider (2004: 680–681, 2009: 411–421, 2011: ch. 9), Dorr (2005: §7, 2008: §1),
Cameron (2008a: 300–301, 2010a: 256, 2010b: §2), and Rettler (ms); cf. Chalmers (2009: 
§2). See Korman (2015a: §3, 2015b: ch. 5) for criticism. See +RUJDQDQG3RWUÏ: ch. 
3) for an alternative compatibilist strategy and Korman (2008b) for criticism.
( ) Van Inwagen (1990: ch. 9). Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997: §5.7) and Merricks 
(2001) defend nearby views. Merricks is often mistakenly cited as endorsing organicism, 
when in fact he offers no answer to the special composition question and is explicitly 
noncommittal about which organisms there are and whether there are any inanimate 
composites; see his (2001: §4.6).
( ) See van Inwagen (1990: chs. 10–11) for an attempt to reconcile organicism with 
ordinary belief. See Tye (1992), Hirsch (1993), Hawthorne and Michael (1996), Sider 
(2001: 178–180), Merricks (2001: 162–170), Varzi (2002: 64–65), Uzquiano (2004a), and
Korman (2009: §3, 2015b: ch. 5) for criticism.
( ) See Markosian (2014: 82–83); see his (2014: 86–87) for a response to the objection 
that the account is objectionably circular.
( ) See Markosian (2014: 73); cf. van Inwagen (1981: 123) and Mellor (2008). STP will be 
a recurring theme: see §4.4, §5.2, and §6.1.
( ) Cf. van Inwagen (1990: 47). See Markosian (2014: 84–85) for a response. Similar 
remarks apply to Koslicki’s (2008: 187–188) “restricted composition principle”; see
Merricks (2009: §1) for discussion.
( ) See Mellor (2008: 68), Williams (2008: §6), Gilmore (2013: §4), and Markosian (2014: 
73–74) for discussion.
( ) See Carmichael (2015: §2 and §3.3) for more on unity-imposing events.
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( ) See van Inwagen (1990: ch. 7), Silva (2013), and Carmichael (2015: §3) for more on 
series-style answers.
( ) See also Hestevold (1981: §3), Rose and Schaffer (forthcoming), and Korman and 
Carmichael (forthcoming) for a discussion of a teleological answer to the special 
composition question, and whether it delivers a commonsense ontology.
( ) See Cartwright (1975: 167), Quine (1981: 13), Van Cleve (1986: 145), Rea (1998: 354–
355), Hudson (2001: 108–112), and Schaffer (2009a: 358n11).
( ) See Korman (2010a, 2015b: ch. 8) for further discussion.
( ) The argument was first advanced by Lewis (1986: 212–213) and later defended in 
greater detail in Sider (1997: §3.1, 2001: §4.9.1) as part of a defense of universalism.
( ) See Nolan (2006: 724).
( ) An exact cut-off might be characterized as a pair of adjacent cases such that in the 
one composition occurs and in the other it doesn’t. Or it might be characterized as a pair 
of adjacent cases such that in the one composition definitely occurs and in the other it
definitely doesn’t. Either characterization is acceptable for our purposes.
( ) The restriction to concrete objects is meant to ensure that numerical sentences aren’t 
trivially false on account of there being infinitely many numbers, sets, and so forth. See
Sider (2001: 127).
( ) This version of the argument is drawn from Sider (2001: §4.9.1). Lewis (1986: 212) 
has a somewhat different argument against borderline composition, resting on the 
principle that if it is indeterminate whether some things compose something then there is 
something such that it is indeterminate whether they compose it. Van Inwagen (1990: ch. 
19) responds to Lewis’s argument by denying this principle; cf. Hawley (2002: §5) and
Korman (2015b: §9.5). See Carmichael (2011: 317) for an argument in defense of the 
principle.
( ) Cf. Sider (2001: 128–130, 2003) and López de Sa (2006) in defense of the preciseness 
of the quantifiers. See Sider (2001: 127), Elder (2004: 65), and Korman (2015b: §9.2) on 
whether the vagueness can be pinned on the concreteness predicate.
( ) See Markosian (1998a: 237–239), Merricks (2005, 2007), Hawthorne (2006), Nolan 
(2006: 725–728), Smith (2006), Cameron (2007: 114–117), and Tahko (2009). See Sider 
(2001: 124–125) and Barnes (2007) for criticism.
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( ) See Hirsch (1999: 149–151, 2002: 65–66, 2008: 376), Koslicki (2003: 116–120, 2008: 
34–40), and Barnes (2013).
( ) Eternalists regard ‘exists’ here as “tenseless”. We are bracketing worries about this 
notion. See Sider (2001: ch. 2) for general discussion of eternalism.
( ) See Hawthorne (2006: 106), Baker (2007: 130–132), Donnelly (2009: §5), and Korman 
(2010b: §4.1, 2015b: §9.4.1) for further discussion of this strategy.
( ) Proponents include Linsky and Zalta (1994, 1996), Williamson (1998, 2002, 2013), 
and arguably Marcus (1985). The label is due to Williamson, whose preferred formulation 
is “necessarily, everything is necessarily something”; see his (2013: §1.5) on ‘exists’.
( ) Cf. Williamson (2013: 21).
( ) Cf. Smith (2005), Hawthorne (2006: 106), Woodward (2011: §3), and Williamson 
(2013: 7n9). While the necessitist strategy resembles the other DEO maneuvers in 
denying that borderline composition ever gives rise to indeterminacy with respect to 
what exists, strictly speaking it is B8 that the necessitist denies: since the envisaged 
DEOs in the grey area are borderline concreta, ‘C’ turns out to be vague. See Gallois 
(2004: 652) for a structurally similar, neo-Meinongian response.
( ) See Williamson (2013: 8).
( ) This response is advanced by Effingham (2009), Wake (2011), and Nolan (2014: §5).
( ) Though see Schaffer (2009b: §4) on both objections. The argument can be modified in 
obvious ways to accommodate worries (perhaps having to do with general relativity) to 
the effect that regions can in principle have different locations. (Even if this region your 
head now occupies could have had some different location, it’s not the case that it would
have been in China had your head been in China.) Thanks to Joshua Spencer for helpful 
discussion.
( ) This terminology is due to Saucedo (2011: §2). We are now assuming (pace
supersubstantivalists) that nothing occupies itself and, thus, an expansion cannot be a 
region.
( ) See Carmichael (2011) and Saucedo (ms).
( ) An alternative (endorsed by Saucedo (ms)), which we will not pursue here, is to 
embrace unrestricted expansionism, the thesis that pluralities of objects always have an 
expansion.
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( ) Suppose D*p. Then we have: DDp & DDDp &…. Therefore, every conjunct of the 
conjunction Dp & DDp & … is definitely true, so D(Dp & DDp & …). The result, DD*p, 
follows by the definition of D*. Cf. Williamson (1994: 160).
( ) See Carmichael (2011: 321–324) for further discussion of this sort of reply.
( ) Though others may be unfazed by this result. Indeed, this is already a commitment of 
the standard account of the vagueness of singular terms like ‘Tibbles’; see Lewis (1993).
( ) An object x is an expansion simpliciter iff it is definitely the case that there are ys 
such that x occupies the region jointly occupied by the ys.
( ) We borrow the names from Paul (2006: 625).
( ) This supposition is hotly contested in the literature. Dissenters include Ayers (1974: 
128–129), Gibbard (1975: §5), Lewis (1976, 1986: §4.5), Price (1977), Tichý (1987/2004: 
§3), Heller (1990: §§2.4–7), Noonan (1991, 1993: §1), Burke (1994), Rea (2000), Jubien 
(2001: 7), Mackie (2007), and Fara (2008, 2012: §2).
( ) See Doepke (1982: 51), Baker (2000: 181), Lowe (2000: 17), and Paul (2006: 653). 
See Wasserman (2002: §§1–2) for discussion.
( ) Perhaps the envisaged colocationist can insist that Athena and Piece (and Nail and 
Piece ) decompose into distinct colocated parts “all the way down”; see Wasserman 
(2002: §1) for discussion.
( ) As in Gibbard (1975: 190).
( ) Four-dimensionalists will typically deny Distinctness in such cases, opting for a 
counterpart-theoretic account of the apparent modal differences; see Lewis (1986: §4.5) 
for discussion.
( ) Neither being Athena-shaped nor being Piece-shaped is a modal property; they’re just 
determinable shapes.
( ) See Fine (1999, 2008), Koslicki (2008), and Sattig (2015: ch. 1); cf. McDaniel (2001)
and Paul (2002: §5, 2006). See Johnston (2006) and Rea (2011) for nonmereological 
varieties of hylomorphism.
( ) Other putative differences that stand in need of explanation can plausibly be 
explained in terms of the modal and sortal differences. For instance, it may be that 
Athena but not Piece is well made (see Fine 2003: 206), and the explanation of this 
difference is that Athena but not Piece is a statue and what it is for a statue to be well 
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made is different from what it is for a piece of clay to be well made. Cf. Bennett (2004: 
341).
( ) See, e.g., Merricks (2009: §3) and Sidelle (2014: §4).
( ) This is not to say that all mereological facts are bedrock, or that there is no answer to 
the special composition question. Rather, the claim is that there is sometimes no answer 
to questions of the form: in virtue of what is x a part of y? That is, there is no answer to
Markosian’s (2014: 72) “Question about Parthood”.
( ) Wasserman (2002: 210–211) considers the question and immediately dismisses it: “it 
would seem plausible for the temporal parts theorist to deny that there is any interesting 
explanation to be given here: the difference in temporal parts … is simply a brute fact, 
not admitting of further analysis or explanation.”
( ) Contrary to Markosian (2014: §3), who objects that this is incompatible with the 
possibility of gunk. See §6.1 below for more on gunk.
( ) Alternatively, one might suggest that mereological facts are not explained in terms of 
location alone and embrace only a modified form of STP :
STP * If (i) the region occupied by x is a subregion of the region occupied by y, 
and (ii) x has some significant causal effect on y, then x is a part of y.
See Mellor (2008). But this thesis has problems of its own (see Williams 2008: §7).
( ) See Schaffer (2003, 2010: §1.2), Cameron (2008c), and Orilia (2009) on the 
supposition that there must be a fundamental level. See Fine (2001), Rosen (2010), and
Schaffer (2009a, 2010) for more on fundamentality and associated priority relations. See
Hofweber (2009) and Wilson (2014) for skepticism about these sorts of appeals to 
fundamentality.
( ) See, e.g., Markosian (2005: §3), Cameron (2014: §3), and Skiles (2015: §3). See
Holden (2004: ch. 4) for some historical context.
( ) The problem we are about to discuss arises even on the much weaker thesis that 
there is some object all of whose parts have proper parts; there is no need to suppose that 
every object is gunky.
( ) The argument is due to Schaffer (2010: §2.4). See Cameron (2007), Miller (2009), and
Sider (2013: §10) for discussion of whether such assumptions are indeed necessary if 
true.
66
67
68
69
70
RTL
RTL
71
72
73
74
Composition
Page 45 of 46
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 15 November 2016
( ) See Bohn (2009), Schaffer (2010: 64–65, 2014: §3.2.3), and Watson (2010) for 
discussion of JT. See Schaffer (2010: §2.2) for further motivations for monism.
( ) See Hudson (2001: §3.5), Williams (2006), and Sider (2013: §§9–10).
( ) Cf. Markosian (1998b: §4) and Lowe (2000: 20) against the proposal that simplicity 
entails indivisibility. See Holden (2004: §2.3) for some historical context.
( ) Cf. Williams (2006: 504–506) and Saucedo (2011: §6).
( ) Such as that found in Schaffer (2010: 61–62).
( ) See note 22 for references.
( ) See Hawthorne and Cortens (1995: §3), +RUJDQDQG3RWUÏ: §3.2), and Sider 
(2009: §§7–10, 2011: ch. 1).
( ) There is room for skepticism about whether this sort of stipulative introduction of the 
existential  quantifier succeeds in fixing any meaning for the quantifier. See Korman 
(2015b: §6.2).
( ) This and similar claims really need to be stated more cautiously, perhaps in terms of 
what the quantifier purports to range over, or perhaps metalinguistically: a sentence of 
the form ‘a exists އLVWUXHMXVWLQFDVHކࣄ [[ DއLVWUXHZKHUHކࣄ ’ is the existential
quantifier. For it may be that what exists  “outstrips” what exists, in which case one had 
better not commit to (the existence of) the domain of existential  quantifier.
( ) McDaniel (2010a: 644) maintains that identity cannot be fundamental, but his 
argument rests on the questionable premise that facts about the exemplification of 
fundamental relations cannot supervene on any other facts.
( ) Cf. Schaffer (2009a: 372).
( ) See Cameron (2010a: 262–263).
( ) See Korman (2015a: §4, 2015b: ch. 6) for further discussion.
( ) Cf. Sider (2013: §1).
( ) Pace Schaffer (2009a: 361), who says, “When the mereological nihilist denies that 
fusions exist, what she is denying is that such entities ultimately exist—she is denying 
that such entities are fundamental.” Contrast van Inwagen (1990: 99–100): “My position 
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vis-à-vis tables and other inanimate objects is simply that there are none. Tables are not 
defective objects or second-class citizens of the world; they are just not there at all.”
( ) See Korman (2011) for an overview of these motivations for eliminating ordinary 
composites.
( ) Thanks to Ralf Bader, Eli Hirsch, Ned Markosian, Trenton Merricks, Noël Saenz, Raúl 
Saucedo, Alan Sidelle, Alex Skiles, and Joshua Spencer for helpful discussion of various 
parts of the paper.
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